Governmental Immunity Doctine in Texas - An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes by Majure, Glen A. et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 4
1969
Governmental Immunity Doctine in Texas - An




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glen A. Majure, et al., Governmental Immunity Doctine in Texas - An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes, 23 Sw L.J. 341 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol23/iss2/4
COMMENTS
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN
TEXAS - AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PROPOSED CHANGES
by Glen A. Majure, W. T. Minick and David Snodgrass
Governmental immunity is one of the more ancient of the common
law rules. The doctrine deprives the judiciary of power to adjudicate dis-
putes against the government, the theory being that the sovereign is above
the courts and thus not susceptible of being sued in its own courts.
Sovereign immunity, as it developed in England, was a logical extension
to the concept of the divine right of kings, but the transplantation to
America is a philosophical paradox. Being a common law doctrine, govern-
mental immunity was first introduced in the United States in Mower v.
Inhabitants of Leicester.' This was a quarter of a century after the Ameri-
can Constitution had set out a government of limited powers. Thus, the
philosophical underpinnings of sovereign immunity did not apply to the
United States when it was introduced to this country.
Nevertheless, the doctrine won rapid and widespread acceptance in the
United States, primarily through court decision. The first reported Texas
case on point adopted governmental immunity without citation of author-
ity.' The court apparently believed that the immunity of the government
was so commonly accepted that citation of authority was superfluous.
Although governmental immunity remains solidly entrenched in most
American jurisdictions, a definite trend toward abrogation of the doctrine
has developed. While it is impossible to point to a specific date, the pas-
sage of the Federal Torts Claims Act' in 1945 signaled the beginning of
the retreat from strict adherence to the immunity doctrine.
In recent years the Texas Legislature has considered several measures
aimed at abrogating the doctrine, or at least ameliorating some of its harsh
effects. In view of the current interest in this area, the purpose of this
Comment is to examine the status of governmental immunity in Texas,
to determine the constitutional power of the legislature to act in this
area, to analyze the developments in the remaining forty-nine states, and
to suggest basic standards which should be embodied in any future legis-
lation.
I. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN TEXAS
The state of Texas is shielded from tort claims by two basic principles
of law. First, the state as a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.'
Secondly, assuming such consent is given by the legislature, the state never-
19 Mass. 247 (1812).
2Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847).
'FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1964).
"Texas-Mexican Ry. v. Jarvis, 80 Tex. 456, 15 S.W. 1089 (1891); State v. Snyder, 66 Tex.
687, 18 S.W. 106 (1886)'; Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847); Giddens v. Williams, 265
S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e.
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theless is not liable for the torts of its agents or employees. The two rules
combine to deny effectively any recourse against the state when one of its
agents or employees tortiously injures a private citizen.
State Immunity from Suit. The principle of state immunity from suit
has been applied by the courts in a rather mechanistic manner. The earlier
cases indicate that the courts had some difficulty in determining exactly
what constituted a suit against the state, but this point was settled over
thirty years ago in San Antonio Independent School District v. Board of
Education.' In that case, the court set forth the following generally ac-
cepted test: "[T]he rule is that a suit against an officer or department or
agency of the state, the purpose or effect of which is to impose liabilities
upon, or enforce liabilities against, the state, is in effect a suit against the
state . . . ." This broad language protects from suit virtually any non-
private agency created under the state constitution or state statutes.
Several exceptions to the immunity of the state from suit have been
preserved. These include a suit compelling a state officer, agent, or employee
to perform a ministerial duty,' enjoining a state officer from acting un-
constitutionally,' asserting a crossclaim related to the initial claim of the
state,"0 and alleging a claim under the condemnation clause of the Texas
Constitution." With the possible exception of the inverse condemnation
claims,'1 these exceptions afford little assistance to a claimant injured by
the negligence of state agents or employees.
The barrier which protects the state from suit is not insurmountable,
even though it is often difficult to overcome. In 1967 the legislature passed
twenty-one enabling resolutions (five of which appeared to sound in
tort) authorizing suit against the state in individual cases." Thus, the
legislature has shown a willingness to pass such resolutions, but the cost to
the claimant in both time and money is often excessive." These resolutions
do not constitute acceptance of liability by the state," and all defenses on
behalf of the state generally are reserved in each resolution.'" Furthermore,
the claimant must be certain that the resolution embodies the theory upon
'Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949); State v. Hale, 136
Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941); State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423 (1936); Welch
v. State, 148 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error ref.; State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error ref.; State v. Flowers, 94 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
6 108 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).7 Id. at 448.
" Laidlaw v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 561, 273 S.W. 789 (1925); see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1735 (1964).
OConstantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932).
"Anderson & Clayton Co. v. State, 122 Tex. 530, 62 S.W.2d 107 (1933).
" TEX. CONST. art. I, S 17.
" The courts have considered several claims of property damage based upon the inverse con-
demnation argument. The claimants have met with little success where the damage was negligently
done. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949).
'"2 Tex. Laws 1967, at 2789, 2798, 2804, 2812, 2816, 2847, 2873, 2878, 2887, 2889, 2896,
2907, 2908, 2922, 2924, 2925, 2927, 2939, 2943, 2954, 2955, 2956.
14 Apparently, approximately one hour of legislative consideration is given such a resolution
(excluding subcommittee hearings), but the claimant must often wait two years or more for con-
sideration. See Schoenburn, Sovereign Immunity, 44 TEX.As L. REV. 151, 177-78 (1965).
"State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423 (1936).
162 Tex. Laws 1967, at 2789, 2873, 2896, 2908, 2922; Schoenburn, supra note 14, at 187.
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which he wishes to sue because he will be limited to that theory at trial. 7
The legislature may impose any restrictions it desires on the suit, and since
such enabling resolutions are in derogation of the common law, they are
strictly construed."
State Immunity from Liability. Even though a resolution grants legisla-
tive consent for the state to be sued, a claimant still must overcome the
immunity of the state from liability for the torts of its agents and em-
ployees." Such immunity is embodied in a rule of substantive law which,
in effect, negates the doctrine of respondeat superior when a state agent or
employee commits a tort."0 The rule is frequently stated in terms of the
governmental-proprietary function distinction. 1 That is, the courts hold
that the state is not liable for the torts of its agents committed in the per-
formance of a governmental function." The implication is that the state
is liable for torts committed in the performance of a proprietary function;
however, such is not the case. Insofar as tort liability is concerned, the state
performs no proprietary functions.'
One Texas case seemingly lends support to the governmental-proprietary
function distinction at the state level. In State v. Elliott24 the plaintiff was
injured on his job with the state-operated railroad. The court spoke of the
proprietary nature of the railroad operation and held the state liable. But
this case only appears to sound in tort, the actual rationale being that the
state contracts with its employees to provide a safe place to work. The
significance of this case, however, was weakened by enactment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act." The actual rule of state immunity from
liability was set out clearly in State v. Hale:"
That the state is not liable for the torts of its agents is not controverted....
[I]f the enabling act gave the legislative consent to sue only for conse-
quential damages resulting from a negligent or tortious manner in which the
highway was constructed, the consent thus given was a fruitless gesture,
conferring the bare right to sue upon a nonexistent cause of action.
Thus, no cause of action against the state exists when a state agent or em-
ployee commits a tort. Consequently, absent a general tort claims act, the
" Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847); State v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 300 S.W.2d 170
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957); State v. Lindley, 133 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dismissed,
judgment correct.
"8State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423 (1936); State v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 300
S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Consent to suit may be withdrawn after the suit is instituted.
Producers' & Refiners' Corp. v. Heath, 81 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), error dismissed.
"'Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949); State v. Hale, 136
Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941).
50Gotcher v. State, 106 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
21 See text accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
2Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 201 SW.2d 810 (1947); State v. Morgan, 140 Tex. 620,
170 S.W.2d 652 (1943); State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423 (1936).
"State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), error ref.
24212 S.W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), error ref.
"TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309 (1964).
2896 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), aff'd, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941). In
that case, the enabling resolution was construed to allow a claim under the condemnation clause
of the Texas Constitution (TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 17).
"796 S.W.2d at 138 (emphasis added).
1969]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
courts of Texas remain almost completely closed to tort actions against
the state.
County Immunity. Theoretically, counties enjoy the same degree of im-
munity as the state. However, the rule granting to the county immunity
from suit has been abrogated by the legislature.' Thus, the courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims against counties, but tort claimants generally
have been unsuccessful because of the rule that counties are immune from
liability for the torts of their agents and employees. Like the state, counties
have been found to perform no proprietary functions which would subject
them to liability."' This immunity applies not only to counties, but also to
drainage districts, ° conservation and reclamation districts,"1 and school
districts. 2 Thus, these political subdivisions are insulated from liability for
the torts of their agents and employees to the same degree as the state.
Municipal Immunity. Municipalities, like counties, can sue and be sued
by virtue of a general statute.3 But municipalities have not been treated
kindly by the courts. In regard to the substantive immunity of munici-
palities, the common law governmental-proprietary function dichotomy
has been preserved. 4 The courts classify as a governmental function any
act undertaken to further the "welfare of the public at large and . . . not
voluntarily assumed just for the benefit of the people of some particular
locality."' Consequently, municipalities are held liable for those torts
committed by their agents or employees in the discharge of a proprietary
function."0
The ease with which the test is stated belies the difficulty of its applica-
tion. The inquiry often results in an attempt by the court to balance the
equities, and, as a result, this area of the law currently is in a highly con-
fused condition. The municipal functions considered by the courts to be
governmental in nature include constructing a storm sewer to carry off
pollutants,"7 constructing and maintaining a cesspool,"s operating a mu-
2STi.x. Rov. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 1573 (1962).
2Harris County v. Gerhart, 115 Tex. 449, 283 S.W. 139 (1926).
so Hodge v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 163 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error
ref. w.o.m. "[D]istricts created under Sec. 59(a) of art. 16 of the constitution 'are political sub-
divisions of the state of the same nature and stand upon exactly the same footing as counties' . . .
and consequently, are immune from liability for torts of their agents and employees." Id. at 857.
1 jld.
"Treadway v. Whitney Independent School Dist., 205 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Braun v. Trustees of Victoria Independent School Dist., 114 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938),
error ref. "[A] school district is purely a governmental agency .... It performs no proprietary
functions .... " Id. at 950.
asTEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 962 (1963).
" Imperial Prod. Corp. v. City of Sweetwater, 210 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1954).
"STreadway v. Whitney Independent School Dist., 205 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
see Dilley v. City of Houston, 148 Tex. 191, 222 S.W.2d 992 (1949); City of Houston v.
Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944); City of Tyler v. Ingram, 139 Tex. 600, 164
S.W.2d 516 (1942).
"0 Cases cited note 35 supra.
"City of Gladcwater v. Evans, 116 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), errr ref.
" Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941).
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nicipal airport," maintaining a public park,' collecting garbage,4' and oper-
ating a hospital.' On the surface, these classifications appear to be reason-
ably consistent, even though some activities seem designed to benefit a
particular locale rather than the general public.
The confusion arises when the municipal activities classified as govern-
mental are compared with those which the courts have found to be proprie-
tary in nature. These proprietary functions include maintaining and oper-
ating a port," maintaining a public park," operating a street grader to clean
gutters, 5 constructing a storm sewer," building and maintaining streets,47
supplying ice to city offices, furnishing water to city residents,4' and
operating an electric power plant." When the two classes of activities are
compared, obvious inconsistencies appear. For example, maintaining a pub-
lic park has been held, at different times, to be both a governmental and a
proprietary function." If a municipality builds and maintains a storm
sewer for the stated purpose of carrying off pollutants, it is protected be-
cause it is engaged in a governmental function." However, if the same
storm sewer is built for the purpose of carrying off flood waters (which
also spread disease and filth), the municipality may be held liable for its
torts because it is engaged in a proprietary function." The distinction is
meaningless since the same potential for injury exists in either situation.
The courts have maintained considerable consistency when the claim
asserted against the municipality has been based on nuisance. In such cases,
numerous courts have imposed liability upon the municipality, even though
the activity was classified as a governmental function. For example, cities
have been held liable for flooding the land of a private citizen," maintain-
ing a dumping ground outside the city limits, and constructing and
operating a sewage disposal plant which gave off offensive odors and gases."
In Parson v. Texas City the court of civil appeals flatly stated that a city
is liable for maintaining a nuisance even though engaged in a govern-
"Imperial Prod. Corp. v. City of Sweetwater, 210 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1954); see TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-15 (1969).
4'Vanderfor v. City of Houston, 286 S.W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
41Venter v. City of Ennis, 283 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
"'City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W.2d 872 (1937); Gartman v. City of Mc-
Allen, 130 Tex. 237, 107 S.W.2d 879 (1937).
4"City of Orange v. Lacoste, Inc., 210 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1954).
"Claitor v. City of Commanche, 271 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). This case held
unconstitutional a statute which attempted to exempt the city from liability for negligence in the
operation of a public park.
"5 City of Panhandle v. Byrd, 130 Tex. 96, 106 S.W.2d 660 (1937).
"'City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57 (1931).
4 Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
4sCity of Wichita Falls v. Lewis, 68 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error dismissed.
49Boiles v. City of Abilene, 276 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error ref.; City of River
Oaks v. Moore, 272 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e.
"City of Greenville v. Branch, 152 S.W. 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), error ref.
"Claitor v. City of Commanche, 271 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (proprietary);
Vanderfor v. City of Houston, 286 S.W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (governmental).
"City of Gladewater v. Evans, 116 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error ref.
"City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57 (1931); City of Waco v. Thompson,
127 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dismissed, judgment correct.
4 City of Ennis v. Gilder, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 351, 74 S.W. 585 (1903), error ref.
"'City of Coleman v. Price, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 117 S.W. 905 (1909), error ref.
"City of Tyler v. House, 64 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
'259 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), error ref.
1969]
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mental function.s" Furthermore, no showing of negligence is required to
maintain such an action."
Obviously, no general test of universal application, and but few gen-
eralizations, can be drawn from the many tort cases dealing with the
liability of municipalities. Any statement of the governmental-proprietary
function rule simply begs the question. As stated by one member of the
Texas supreme court, some of the distinctions look "pretty silly.""0 The
simple fact is that unless a claimant can allege a case of nuisance, the out-
come of his suit is not predictable.
Summary. The difficult legal questions currently involved in asserting a
simple tort claim against the state, county, or municipality require a criti-
cal re-evaluation of the law of governmental immunity. The inequities
of the doctrine are readily apparent, and with some frequency the news
media point out individuals having particularly meritorious claims who
have been denied a remedy because of this antiquated body of law." As
state and local governments become more active and ubiquitous, the num-
ber of such incidents is likely to increase.
The trend throughout the United States definitely is toward abrogation
of the doctrine of governmental immunity, either in whole or in part.
Perhaps this is because the arguments in favor of preserving it have lost
their vitality. The proposition that the doctrine protects the state from
nuisance suits is unproven at best. Those states which have abolished the
doctrine have experienced no great raid on the public treasury. Further-
more, the doctrine is in derogation of the basic principle underlying all
tort law; for every wrong there should be a remedy. In fact, the Texas
Constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law." 2 Thus, in future legislation, Texas should
re-evaluate its position and should assume fully the constitutionally pre-
scribed posture which its courts have so long emasculated.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE RETREAT
FROM GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN TEXAS
A multitude of constitutional provisions may affect legislative action
to abrogate, wholly or partially, governmental immunity in Texas. It is
thought that most constitutional limitations will determine only the direc-
tions that legislative action should take. The purpose of this discussion is
solely to explore the constitutional power of the legislature to take any
action which marks a retreat from governmental immunity from torts.
" Id. at 334. But the court did not find liability here, holding that a faulty traffic light was
not a nuisance.
a9City of River Oaks v. Moore, 272 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e.;
City of Dallas v. Early, 281 S.W. 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), error dismissed.
60 Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined, and, if So, by Whom?,
31 TEX. B.J. 1036, 1066 (1968).
61 Dallas Morning News, Jan. 28, 1969, § D, at 1, col. 4.62 TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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Scope of Constitutional Inquiry. First, the scope of the constitutional
problems relating to legislative abrogation of governmental immunity in
Texas must be defined. In-some jurisdictions the immunity of the state is
established by the constitution itself, usually in the form of a directive
that the state shall not be made a defendant in any action in the courts
of the state." Such is not the case in Texas, however, for immunity is
derived from the common law." As a common law doctrine, governmental
immunity can be changed by the legislature or by the courts; thus, the
constitutional prohibitions, if any, are indirect.
The scope of the constitutional limitations can be further narrowed by
a basic understanding of the common law doctrine of governmental im-
munity in Texas. As discussed above, the doctrine actually consists of two
immunities: (1) immunity from suit, and (2) immunity from liability.
The courts usually define the immunity from suit in these words: The
state cannot be sued in her own courts without her consent."5 On the other
hand, immunity from liability is commonly defined in this fashion: The
state cannot be held liable for the torts of its officers, agents, or employees
unless she expressly consents to such liability." Clearly, the immunities
do not apply if consent is obtained from the state. Thus, the narrowed
constitutional questions are whether the state may give its consent in either
case, and, if so, in what manner must such consent be given? Because the
answers to these questions depend upon the nature of the immunity under
consideration, the two immunities will be considered separately.
One further delimitation must be made. It has been stated that since
the courts have never seriously questioned the constitutionality of special
acts of the legislature waiving immunity (i.e., giving consent), a general
act would be constitutional." The validity of this statement is of obvious
importance, and it will be analyzed carefully in relation to the above
questions.
Immunity from Suit. The principle of immunity from suit had its origin
in the common law; therefore, the immunity apparently can be waived
by statute or court decision. The Texas courts consider the waiving of
immunity to be a legislative function and thus have not involved them-
selves with this problem."' The legislature, however, often has waived the
immunity. Such statutory waiver of suit usually is embodied in a private
bill which authorizes a named individual to proceed against the state."9
" ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20; W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 35.
"Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847).
65State Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 6 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Tex. 1934); W.D. Haden Co. v.
Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838 (1958); Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847); State
v. Noser, 422 S.W.2d 594 (1967), error 'ref. n.r.e.
"6Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 201 S.W.2d 810 (1947).
"7See text accompanying notes 84-92 infra.
68 As Justice Greenhill of the present Supreme Court of Texas noted in a recent article on
governmental immunity, court abrogation would have to be all or nothing. On the other hand,
the legislature could fix arbitrary limits, budget expenditures in advance, and define areas of im-
munity. Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined, and, if So, by
Whom?, 31 Tim. B.J. 1036, 1070 (1968).
69An example of such a bill is contained in State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 34, 146 S.W.2d 731,
735 (1941):
Section 1. That the consent of the Legislature of the state of Texas is hereby given
1969]
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The power of the legislature to waive the immunity from suit through
private bills, a practice which has existed in Texas since the Republic be-
came a state, has never been questioned seriously. Among the numerous
cases reaching the appellate level, no court has declared the private act
granting consent to sue as unconstitutional. Academically, however, it
appears that such private bills at least approach violation of several con-
stitutional provisions.
First, section 3 of the Texas Bill of Rights" provides that all men have
equal rights, a parallel to the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution7' providing for equal protection of the laws. The United
States Supreme Court has said that equal protection of the laws requires
"that [all persons] should have like access to the courts of the country
for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress
of wrongs and the enforcement of contracts . . . ,,"" Thus, if the same
interpretation applies to the Texas equal rights provision, ostensibly private
acts conferring the right to sue the state are invalid. Pragmatically speak-
ing, the legislature presently may grant or withhold permission to sue at
its pleasure. Furthermore, no standard for determining who shall be given
permission to sue can be gleaned from the private acts, and in this regard
it appears that waivers of immunity from suit are granted on an arbitrary
basis. Thus, by virtue of the private bills, some persons receive a right
of access to the courts that is denied to other persons.
However, the Texas courts have not taken this position on the con-
stitutionality of private acts which confer permission to sue. For example,
in Martin v. Sheppard" the legislature passed a private act enabling Mrs.
Martin to sue the State Highway Department for damages for injuries
resulting in the death of her husband while in the employ of the Depart-
ment. The act also provided that the action would be tried and determined
according to the same rules of law and procedure as to liability and defense
that would be applicable if such suit were against an ordinary Texas cor-
poration (waiver of immunity from liability). This apparent attempt to
waive immunity from liability was held violative of the equal rights pro-
vision of the constitution since Mrs. Martin was not subject to the same
defenses that would be available to the state in a suit filed against it by
any other person." Thus, the court correctly applied the equal rights pro-
viso to the attempted waiver of immunity from liability; yet, the court
refused to apply the same reasoning to that portion of the private bill
to W.S. Hale and wife, Mary D. Hale, his executor, administrator and heirs to file
and prosecute suit against the state of Texas and the State Highway Commission
by reason of the alleged negligence in construction of State Highway No. 43 in
and through Leon County, Texas, which construction was begun in July, 1927, and
especially by reason of the constructing of said highway in such manner as to
overflow and otherwise damage the lands of said Hale. Said suit shall be brought
in Travis County, Texas.
70 Tex. CONST. art. I, § 3: "All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights,
and no man, or set of men, is entitled to separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in con-
sideration of public services."
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S I.




granting Mrs. Martin permission to sue the state. Moreover, the court
stated that "[i]t cannot be questioned that the legislature had the power
to grant relators permission to sue the state and to provide the manner of
service."'"
That pronouncement by the supreme court apparently is now the
law in Texas; however, if the present supreme court thought it nec-
essary to abrogate the doctrine that the state cannot be sued without
its consent, as the highest courts of so many other states have already
done,"  section 3 of the Texas Bill of Rights remains a convenient
constitutional hook upon which to hang a decision.
Secondly, private bills granting permission to sue the state may violate
the Texas constitutional provision forbidding the legislature to pass local
or special laws. Article III, section 5 6" enumerates several items, including
a prohibition against setting the jurisdiction of courts or changing the
rules of evidence before any court or other judicial tribunal,78 which may
not be made the subjects of special enactments. Consent to sue is a juris-
dictional conferment,7 ' and if the special act provides a particular venue,
as most acts do, then it seems that jurisdiction is being conferred on one
court in violation of the constitutional provision. This was not the posi-
tion taken by the court of civil appeals in Martin v. State." In that case
the plaintiff had been authorized, by special enactment, to sue the state
"in a court of competent jurisdiction, in Jeff Davis County, Texas.""
After the trial court dismissed the action, the court of civil appeals re-
versed with the bland and erroneously authoritateda statement that "con-
sent may be given to sue by special laws and that when so given, the acts
are not violative of constitutional provisions against granting special
privilege."'"
By upholding the special act, the court in Martin v. State may have ne-
glected another provision of section 56. After listing the items which may
not be made the subjects of special enactments, the section forbids any
7- Id.
6 See text accompanying notes 174-88 infra.
17 TEX. CONST. art. 111, 56.
78 Id. "The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any
local or special law, authorizing:
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial
proceeding or inquiry before courts .... "
" Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 643, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1947): "By virtue of [the
private bill] and by the service of process and the appearance of the State through its Attorney
General, the court clearly acquired jurisdiction of the parties to the litigation."
8075 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
8s S. Con. Res. 53, 43d Leg., Reg. Sess. 1016 (1933).
"2The court cites to footnote 45, 59 C.J. States § 460 (1932), which states that it is con-
stitutional to provide consent to sue the state to assert a right previously possessed. The Texas
case cited in that footnote, State v. Elliott, 212 S.W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), held that the
state was liable for its torts when engaged in a proprietary function. Thus, disregarding the merits
of the Elliott decision, there was a previous right in that decision. The authority does not indicate
the effect of giving consent to sue on a non-existent or doubtful claim as in Martin v. State. Ad-
ditionally, reliance on State v. Elliott to any extent is questionable since that decision is a maverick
among case, dealing with governmental immunity.
SaMartin v. State, 75 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
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other special enactment where a general law can be made applicable. 4 The
holding of the court may indicate its belief that a general consent-to-sue
statute could not be enacted. However, a better interpretation of the
holding would be that a general consent could not be given on Martin's
cause of action. Since Martin was the only person who could recover for
his injuries, only he could be given consent to sue.
Based on the foregoing, the proposition that a general consent-to-sue
statute is constitutional because special consents to sue are constitutional
is academically weak. In practice, however, the premise may be strong in-
deed. The continued use and success of private consent-to-sue statutes in-
dicates a willingness of the courts to suspend immunity where the state
indicates such a desire, constitutional limitations notwithstanding.
A general waiver of the immunity from suit should be received even
more hospitably than the private statutes. A general waiver does not
violate equal protection since it is applicable to every citizen of the state.
Likewise, by definition, it escapes the challenge of the special enactment
provision. The multitude of cases which sanction consent to sue cannot
be ignored. Thus, a general consent-to-sue statute must be assumed to be
constitutional. To do otherwise would be to ignore Texas judicial and leg-
islative history.
To a limited extent, general consent-to-sue statutes are already in use.
It has been a practice in the creation of political subdivisions, such as
counties,"5 municipalities,"8 road districts," school districts," navigation dis-
tricts,"5 park boards," and water supply districts, 1 to provide that such
subdivision may sue and be sued in the courts of the state. While this lan-
guage may be interpreted to mean only that the political subdivision must
be recognized as an entity capable of appearing in an action, several courts
have assumed silently that the language constituted a waiver of immunity
to suit as well. 2
Immunity from Liability. Assuming that consent to sue the state has been
obtained, the plaintiff must still overcome the immunity of the state from
liability." This immunity has its own distinct policy and historical basis 4
and depends to no extent upon the immunity from suit. Generally, im-
munity from liability means that no right of action lies against the state
84 "And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law
shall be enacted; . . ." Tux. CONsT. art. III, § 56.
8
"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1573 (1962).
881d. art. 962 (1963).
8711d. art. 752r (1964).
88 1d. art. 2767(b) (1965).
891d. art. 8228 (1954).
goId. art. 6079f, § 11 (1962).
81 Id. art. 7807f, § 9 (1954).
o2 Fylipoy v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 257 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. Tex. 1966); In re Nueces County,
Texas, Road District No. 4, 174 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Farmers State Bank v. Bowie
County, 127 Tex. 641, 95 S.W.2d 1304 (1936).
aThe cases make it quite clear that obtaining consent to sue does not affect he non-liability
of the state for torts. In re Nueces County, Texas, Road District No. 4, 174 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.
Tex. 1959); State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423 (1936); Brooks v. State, 68 S.W.2d
534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error ref.
"' The distinction is discussed in the recent article by Justice Greenhill, note 68 supra.
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for a tort committed by her officers, agents, and employees unless liability
is expressly assumed by the state.9 Thus the effect of expressly assuming
liability is to create a right of action against the state.' Since the action
will be worthless without funds to pay a judgment, the question of the
power of the legislature to consent to liability necessarily encompasses the
question of its power to appropriate funds in satisfaction of such liability.
Most of the cases which have denied liability for a tort committed by
the state or its agents have stated that recovery depends upon whether the
state has expressly assumed such liability (i.e., waived immunity)." Since
the courts have concluded almost unanimously that the state had not ex-
pressly assumed liability in each of the respective fact situations," the
question of whether the state could assume tort liability rarely has been
put in issue. The cases which have turned on this question can be placed
conveniently into two categories-retroactive and prospective assumptions
of tort liability.
Retroactive Assumption of Tort Liability. Retroactive assumption of tort
liability by the legislature takes the form of a private bill, and such as-
sumption of liability usually is contained in the same special act which
gives a particular individual consent to sue the state." As noted previ-
ously,' the constitutionality of a private consent-to-sue statute has never
been doubted; however, the assumption of liability by the state runs afoul
of constitutional prohibitions not applicable to consent-to-sue statutes.
Article III, section 44 of the Texas Constitution i°0 prohibits the grant or
appropriation of state money to any individual making a claim which has
not been provided for by pre-existing law. The term "pre-existing law"
has been interpreted to mean that at the time the claim arose, there must
have been in force a valid law such as would form the basis of a judgment
"' Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949); Martin v. Sheppard,
145 Tex. 639, 201 S.W.2d 810 (1947); State v. Dickerson, 141 Tex. 475, 174 S.W.2d 244 (1943);
State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941).
" It is assumed herein that the legislature will adopt, if anything, an approach which will re-
quire a claimant to prove his claim before a court in order to obtain damages. Assumedly, the
legislature could adopt a plan by which an administrative agency or even a legislative commission,
would make all determinations. In such a case, the claimant stands or falls on that determination.
" See cases cited note 95 supra.
s Typical consent to suit bills provide that suit may be brought against the state " 'in order to
ascertain, fix, and award the amount of money, if any,' [that the claimants] 'are entitled to re-
ceive . . . as compensation by reason of such injuries and resulting damages.'" State v. McKinney,
76 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error ref. It has been regularly held, even in the face
of acknowledgment by the legislature that the damages resulted from negligence of state em-
ployees, that these words only entitle the claimant to test the matter of liability through the
courts. See, e.g., Fonseca v. State, 297 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Apparently, the -legis-
lature must use the words "assume liability" or similar words of unequivocal meaning. See, e.g.,
Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dismissed, judgment correct.
This attitude on the part of the courts seems unnecessarily strict. Legislative consent to sue on
facts which can only support a claim based on tort would seem adequate indication of the legis-
lature's intent to assume liability.
9 The private bill in Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dis-
missed, judgment correct, provided for consent to sue, venue, limitations, assumption of liability,
and appropriation to pay the judgment.
10 See text accompanying notes 68-92 supra.
'1 TEx. CONST. art. III, § 44. "The legislature . . . shall not grant . . . by appropriation
or otherwise, any amount of money out of the treasury of the state, to any individual, on a claim,
real or pretended, when the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing laws; . . ."
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against the state in a court of competent jurisdiction in the event the state
should permit itself to be sued." 2 Thus, section 44 requires the existence of
a legal right to be free from the injury complained of (pre-existing law)
prior to the happening of events which give rise to the injury (claim).
Since the private bill creates the right of action after the claim arose, the
requirements of section 44 are not met; thus funds may not be appropri-
ated to pay the judgment of a successfully prosecuted action.' ° The courts
have gone one step beyond this rather automatic application of section 44
and have held that the provision prevents even the granting of a right of
action, as distinguished from the appropriation of funds, for a tort pre-
viously committed by the officers, agents, or employees of the state."'
While the words of section 44 do not seem so demanding, the interpreta-
tion is reasonable; the creation of a right of action necessarily involves the
creation of a right to collect on a judgment if a cause of action is success-
fully established by the plaintiff. Because appropriation to pay the judg-
ment would be in violation of section 44, the right to proceed to judgment
also must be unconstitutional.
Another interpretation of section 44 seems equally reasonable. Since the
provision forbids only appropriations, the individual should be able to
pursue a right of action granted by the legislature. If successful, the judg-
ment upon finality becomes a new claim.1"' A later appropriation by the
legislature to pay this claim would not be violative of section 44 since the
state has no immunity from liability in an action on a final judgment
rendered against the state (i.e., there is pre-existing common law)."°
Prospective Assumption of Tort Liability. Assumption of liability for fu-
ture torts clearly circumvents the prohibition contained in section 44 since
the assumption is the pre-existing law for later claims. However, prospec-
tive assumption of liability must be undertaken on a general basis rather
than through private legislation. Obviously, the legislature cannot provide
a right of action for a particular individual on the speculation that at
some future date that person will have a tort claim against the state. Thus,
analysis of the constitutional effects on prospective assumption of liability
must relate to the creation of a right of action which will apply generally
to the public at large.
The chief constitutional threats 7 to general assumption by the state of
liability for torts are the several provisions which deny power to the leg-
i° 2 Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272, 71 S.W.2d 242 (1934).
103 Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dismissed, judgment correct.
104 Id. The appeals court affirmed a lower court's decision, sustaining a general demurrer. Thus,
the action was dismissed because it would have been unconstitutional to pay the judgment.
''See 34 TEx. JuR. 2d Judgments § 443 (1962).
'SMartin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 644, 201 S.W.2d 810, 813 (1947), citing Harkness v.
Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S.W. 1120 (1897) and City of Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13,
40 S.W. 140 (1897).
107There are several constitutional questions concerning assumption of tort liability by the
state which will not be treated herein. It is felt that the problems either are not serious enough
to merit discussion or are resolved by the same considerations applicable to the following textual
discussion. Some of the more important of these constitutional questions deserve listing in this
footnote:
(a) If the legislature, through a Texas Tort Claims Act, prescribes the standards and me-
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islature to grant public moneys to individuals. Article III, section 51 pro-
hibits the state from granting public funds to "any individual, association
of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever . . . . "' Section
52 of the same article denies the legislature power to authorize political
subdivisions "to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any
individual, association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stock-
holder in such corporation, association or company . *.. .0. Article XVI,
section 6 states quite simply that "[n]o appropriation for private or in-
dividual purposes shall be made, unless authorized by [the] constitu-
tion.'"" °
As noted previously,"' the courts apparently have taken the position
that if the appropriation is invalid, then the assumption of liability that
gives rise to the appropriation also is invalid. Hence, these constitutional
provisions, although relating to the appropriation of money and not to the
granting of a right of action, may restrict the granting of a right of
action.
The constitutional restraints against granting public money to indivi-
duals have not been applied strictly."2 They have been held inapplicable
where a governmental or public purpose for the expenditure exists."' Con-
sequently, it is not of controlling importance that a private person bene-
fit from a particular expenditure so long as the grant is not a gift and is
not intended for private purposes." 4 An expenditure is not considered a
gift if there is consideration flowing to the state; the benefits to the state in
having a public purpose served by the expenditure provide the considera-
tion for the expenditure."' The ultimate question, therefore, is whether
state money paid to an individual for damages sustained as a result of a
state tort serves a public or governmental purpose.
The constitution has been amended on several occasions to authorize
expenditures previously thought to be violative of the provisions prohib-
iting the the grant of public money to individuals. It is helpful to look at
chanics for presentation, consideration, determination, or adjudication, and subsequent payment
of claims factually found to be meritorious under the Act, do such provisions amount to delegation
of legislative power in violation of TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1?
(b) Does the purchase of insurance to pay for injuries sustained as a result of state tort con-
stitute a giving or lending of the credit of the state in contravention of TEX. CONST. art. III, § 50?
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52 makes the same limitation applicable to municipal corporations.
(c) Would payment of damages to an individual injured as a result of a tort committed by
a state employee constitute assumption by the state of the liability of the employee in violation of
TEX. CoNsT. art. III, § 50?
(d) Does assumption by the state of liability for torts committed in the future constitute a
creation of debt not specifically allowed in TEX. CoNsT. art. III, § 49?
(e) Does the levy and collection of taxes for the payment of damages suffered as a result of
state inflicted torts constitute taxation for private purposes in violation of TEX. CoNsT. art. VIII,§3?
1 TEX. CoNsTr. art. III, 5 51.
0' Id. art. III, § 52.
1°Id. art. XVI, § 6(a).
. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
... These provisions were placed in the constitution in response to reconstruction period legis-
lation "which was marked by profligacy." Interpretive Commentary, TEX. CoNsT. art. III, § 51.
The need for such limitations has decreased as the legislature has become more responsible.
"'City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 112 Tex. 339, 247 S.W. 818 (1923); TEx. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. No. V-1067 (1950).
"
4 TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Or. No. V-1067 (1950); TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. C-584 (1966).
"'TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. C-584 (1966).
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the amendments to section 51 to identify what has been considered to be
a private purpose or a gift. Article III, section 51 contains two internal
exceptions: (1) aid to indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sail-
ors or their widows, and (2) aid in cases of public calamity. " ' Section 51a
provides for monetary assistance to needy aged, needy blind, and needy
children. " 7 Sections 51-e'. and 51-f " ' authorize the legislature and incor-
porated cities and towns to pay retirement and disability pensions to mu-
nicipal employees. Section 51g authorizes the legislature to appropriate
money to provide social security coverage for proprietary employees of
political subdivisions. 2 ' It is obvious from this quick survey of corrective
amendments to section 51 that some purposes far more public than as-
sumption of tort liability have been made the subject of constitutional
authorization. This is by no means conclusive, however, since all the amend-
ments were motivated by Attorney General Opinions rather than by court
decision."'
More relevant are certain amendments which were adopted in response
to court decisions. Sections 59, 60, and 61 of article 111 '22 authorize the
legislature to provide workmen's compensation insurance for state, coun-
ty, and municipal employees, respectively. These sections were added to
the constitution as a result of the Commission of Appeals' (Section B)
decision in City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n."' This case
involved the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act to em-
ployees of an incorporated city. The Act provides compensation to em-
ployees for personal injuries sustained in the course of employment. If the
Act applied to the city, it would have placed personal injury liability upon
a political subdivision of the state-precisely the question of concern in
this Comment.
The determinative issue in Tyler related to the intention of the legisla-
ture when it made the Act applicable to "corporations." After noting sev-
eral grounds upon which it could be said that municipal corporations were
not within the meaning of "corporations," the court further reasoned that
the legislature would not have intended to enact an unconstitutional sta-
tute. ' It was found that article III, section 5225 would have been violated
in two respects had the legislature intended the Act to apply to municipal
corporations. First, the court stated that Texas Employer's Insurance As-
sociation was a corporation engaged in the insurance business on the mu-
tual plan, and therefore, subscribers were stockholders in such corpora-
. TEX. CONST. art. 1II, § 51.
'
1 71d art. III, 5 51a.
115 d. art. Ill, 5 51-e.
12 ld. art. III, 5 51-f.120 1d. art. III, S 51g.
121 For an excellent example of the conservatism of the Attorney General's office in regard to
the public-money-to-individual provisions during the amendment period, see TEx. ATT'Y GEN.
Or. No. 2914 (1933). This opinion has been impliedly overruled by subsequent opinions, including
TEx. ATT'Y GEN. O's. Nos. V-1067 (1950) and C-584 (1966).
122 TEX. CONST. art. 111, § 59; Id. art. III, § 60; Id. art. III, 5 61.
123 288 S.W. 409 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926).
124 Id. at 411.
125 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52.
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tion. In this regard, section 52 prohibits a city from becoming a stock-
holder in a corporation." Second, the court stated:
[I]t is clear that to permit a municipal corporation to become a subscriber
to the insurance association ... authorizes it to grant public money by way
of premiums for insurance in aid of its employees to whom it is under no
legal liability to pay. As already pointed out, the act contemplates compen-
sation in the absence of any legal liability other than the acceptance of the
plan. Cities and towns have no power to appropriate the tax money of its
citizens to such a purpose. It is at best a gratuity, a bonus to the employ6.
The city might as well pay his doctor's fee, his grocer's bill, or grant him
a pension.127
Clearly, the holding indicates the court's belief that payment of insur-
ance premiums to provide compensation for injuries to state employees is
the granting of public money to individuals in violation of section 52. This
holding casts uncertainty upon the constitutionality of a general assump-
tion of tort liability by the state. The creation of a right of action against
the state for tortious injuries caused by the state through its employees ap-
pears to be so closely analogous to the application of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to state employees as to belie distinction. In fact, the work-
men's compensation scheme seems to have more constitutional justification
on "public purpose" grounds than does assumption of liability by the
state for its torts. The state has a master-servant relationship to the em-
ployee who receives workmen's compensation benefits; thus the state has a
more stringent duty to him than it has to a mere citizen."' Additionally,
compensation benefits for injury to the employee could be considered as an
element of the employee's salary or wages and not a gift.2 Payment of
wages to employees of the state is apparently a public purpose.
While the Tyler decision has not been overruled, it has been weakened
substantially by later decisions. On rehearing,"' the majority reaffirmed its
position but emphasized that several other reasons supported its holding.
It is important to note that presiding Judge Powell changed his vote on the
constitutional question on the ground that the expenditures were for the
general public good and not violative of section 52.
Three years later, in Southern Casualty Co. v. Morgan,"' the Commis-
sion of Appeals (Section A) considered the identical problem posed in
Tyler. The majority of the court in Morgan impliedly accepted the cor-
rectness of Tyler but held that the contract between the city and the insur-
ance company (the method by which payment of compensation was
effected), even though ultra vires, was not void. The court then went on
to hold that:the insurance company was estopped from asserting the bene-
226 Id. "The legislature shall have no power to authorize any . . . political . . . subdivision
to become a stockholder in [a] corporation, association or company .... "
I" City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 288 S.W. 409, 412 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926).
... Collins v. Pecos & N.T. Ry., 110 Tex. 577, 212 S.W. 477 (1919); State v. Elliott, 212
S.W. 695 . (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), error ref.
"9-It has been held that a pension for city employees is -not a gift, but part of the employee's
compensation. Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738 (1928). There is little difliculty
in extending Byrd to group hospitalization and from there to workmen's compensation benefits.
...City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 294 S.W.- 195 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).
' 12 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
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fits of the contract.13 Thus, the decision allowed compensation to the city
employees despite the fact that the court assumed that the act of providing
such compensation was unconstitutional.
Two concurring judges expressly disagreed with the part of the Tyler
decision which held that the legislature is without power to compensate
state employees for their injuries while on the job. They believed that the
policy of insurance became a part of the consideration for employment
and was not, therefore, a gratuity. It was further stated by one of these
judges that "there is absolutely no provision of the constitution which
prohibits the legislature from altering or changing the common-law liability
of cities and towns in cases of this character."' 3
In McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co. 3" the Supreme Court of Texas
in 1938 finally was presented with the latent conflict between Tyler and
Morgan. In that case the city of Corpus Christi contracted with the in-
surance company to provide compensation for injured city employees. It
was understood that the contract was not under the authority of the
Workmen's Compensation Act even though its benefits were measured by
the standards of the Act. In an appeal from a suit by a city employee's wife
to recover compensation under the contract for the death of her husband,
the supreme court held that the insurance company was estopped to plead
the illegality of the contract." Thus, the Morgan reasoning was adopted.
There was one important difference between the two cases, however. By
the time of the McCaleb decision, section 59 of article III' had been added
to the constitution, authorizing the legislature to enact laws to provide for
workmen's compensation insurance for state employees. Consequently, the
court in McCaleb did not have to meet the constitutional issue; rather it
had to consider only whether the legislature, pursuant to the amendment,
had authorized the city to provide such insurance. The purchase of com-
pensation insurance without such authorization was only ultra vires and
subject to the estoppel rule.
Because of subsequent decisions"' and constitutional revisions, 3' the
remnants of Tyler are of little aid in determining whether state assump-
tion of tort liability by a general statute would serve a public purpose.
Tyler presents one view-a divided one at that.
The other view is represented by Graham v. Worthington,' an Iowa
supreme court case which found that the Iowa Tort Claims Act 4" was con-
sistent with the state constitutional provision against giving public money
to individuals. The court stated:
13"Id. at 201-02. The estoppel theory was based on the fact that the insurance company had
accepted the premiums from the city and could not, therefore, later assert that the contract was
illegal.
'
3 3 Id. at 202.
14 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W.2d 679 (1938).
'mId. at 683.
"as TEx. CONST. art. III, § 59.
'
37 McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W.2d 679 (1938); City of Tyler
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 294 S.W. 195 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927) (rehearing); Southern
Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 12 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
'" TEX. CONST. art. III, SS 59, 60, 61.
1 "Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966).
140IoWA ConE ANN. S 25A (1967).
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The general purpose of [the Iowa Tort Claims Act] is to impose upon all
the people of this state the burden, expense and cost which arise from
tortious damage to property or injuries to persons by the officers, agents
and employees of our state government. This is a valid means of promoting
the general welfare of the state. This is a public purpose.1""
It was implied that the general welfare was served by state recognition of
"claims which rest upon such principles of right and equity as are funda-
mental to our jurisprudence, and which appeal to the public sense of jus-
tice as a moral obligation of the state."''
Whether the Supreme Court of Texas would agree with the Iowa pro-
nouncement is an open question. There is a paucity of Texas case law on
the issue of what constitutes a public purpose. In addition, no specific defi-
nition of the phrase has ever been adopted by the Texas courts; on the con-
trary, such a determination has been dealt with on a case by case basis.' 3
An indication of the supreme court's approach to the problem, however,
is illustrated by State v. City of Austin. "4' The legislature had enacted a
statute which provided reimbursement to utility companies for their ex-
penses incurred in relocating facilities necessitated by highway improve-
ment."'4 The statute was challenged on the ground that it violated the con-
stitutional provisions against granting public money to individuals.' In
upholding the statute, the court adopted an enlightened policy, noting that
no net gain accrued to the utility companies because of the reimbursement.
The only benefit was relief from financial burden which the state could
require the company to bear. The court then isolated the ultimate question
and provided a liberal answer:
The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay
part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is
subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitu-
tional donation for a private purpose. We think not, provided the statute
creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the
matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not
fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.'
Application of this language to state assumption of tort liability appears
to be warranted. As discussed above, general assumption of tort liability
would be applied prospectively.' The public has a real and legitimate in-
terest in such action since each member of the public is a potential victim
of state torts and each member is a potential beneficiary of an act which
would allow the state to assume liability for its torts. Likewise, general as-
sumption of liability for prospective torts would not be fraudulent, arbi-
trary, or capricious since it would apply to everyone in the same manner.
There is one problem, however, in applying the Austin language to state
assumption of liability for the torts of its officers, agents, and employees.
141Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626, 636-37 (1966).
'42 146 N.W.2d at 636.
4
'Ex Parte Conger, 163 Tex. 505, 357 S.W.2d 740 (1962).
'44160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960).
"4TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674w-4 (1957).
' This was a declaratory judgment action instituted by the Attorney General of Texas.
"17State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 356, 331 S.W.2d 737, 743 (1960).
148 See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
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Austin clearly requires that the loss or expense, which is being reimbursed,
be sustained as a result of the exercise of the state police power (i.e., to
serve a public purpose). The argument is sure to be made that the state
has no power to act tortiously and that the state is powerless to authorize
its employees to so act. Perhaps it is time to recognize that the state must
rely on its employees and appointees to perform the acts necessary to
achieve a police power objective or policy. The simple truth is that indi-
viduals do not always act in a reasonable fashion and that this trait in the
human personality does not disappear upon association with the state. As-
suming a negligent act is committed in the performance of a governmental
function, the state should be able to consider compensation for the injuries
caused by that act as an operating expense of achieving the governmental
purpose. As the court emphasized in Austin, "[o]ur fundamental law does
not contemplate or require that every private injury and loss which may
be necessary to protect or promote the public health, safety, comfort and
convenience must always be borne by individuals and corporations."' 45
Assumption of liability for state torts in itself may be a valid exercise
of the police power. Such assumption has as its overriding purpose the pro-
tection of the health, safety, and comfort of the public. Even though a few
individuals ultimately will receive monetary benefits from a tort claims
act, every person in the state will have the protection of such an act. Pub-
lic purpose would appear to be served if every person in the state could
feel safer and more comfortable in the thought that if injured by the
state, he will be made whole again.
Summary. To some extent this discussion has been academic. It has been
shown that there is weak logic and weak precedent favoring unconstitu-
tionality of the assumption of tort liability by the state. Likewise, there are
strong arguments, even if unsupported by Texas precedent, which sup-
port constitutionality. There is a non-academic factor, however, which
tends to remove doubt as to constitutionality. Reference is made to the re-
cently published article by Justice Greenhill of the Texas supreme court
which called for immediate legislative action regarding the liability of the
state for its torts.' It is significant that Justice Greenhill did not advocate
a constitutional amendment for such purpose. It cannot be known how
many other supreme court justices silently jointed with Justice Greenhill
in his plea, but it can be deduced that His Honor would not have at-
tempted to stimulate legislative action in the fact of a recalcitrant ma-
jority.
III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THE STATES
In considering possible remedial measures, careful study should be given
to the legislative and judicial experience of other states regarding govern-
mental immunity. The most practical approach to such a study is to an-
alyze the states on the basis of two categories: (1) those which have not
"'State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 357, 331 S.W.2d 737, 743 (1960).
150 Greenhill, supra note 68.
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altered substantially the rule of governmental immunity, and (2) those
which have altered substantially the immunity doctrine. An examination
of the states in which the general rule of immunity has not been altered
substantially not only reveals the common tort immunity of these states
but also the areas in which they have accepted limited liability in spite of
the general rule of immunity. Conversely, an examination of the states
which have either abrogated or substantially altered the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity discloses common areas of liability as well as problem
areas in which some of these states have preserved the immunity through
legislative and judicial exceptions to the general rule of liability.
A. States Which Have Not Altered Substantially the Common Law
Rule of Governmental Immunity
General Rule of Immunity. Approximately thirty states, including Texas,
retain the basic common law rule providing immunity for the state and
its political subdivisions. Of this number, Alabama, Arkansas, and West
Virginia have constitutional provisions establishing governmental im-
munity,1 ' and the remainder appear to have adopted the doctrine by
court decision. Within the states in which governmental entities are im-
mune from tort liability, suits cannot be brought against the state or its
political subdivisions unless legislative consent is given."' In a few states,
the established courts will hear suits once the state has given its consent
to the suit. In other states, special courts and claims boards have been es-
tablished to handle authorized suits against governmental entities. There
are still a few jurisdictions in which the injured citizen can recover only
after the enactment of a private bill on his behalf in the state legislature.
While actual statutory consent is required before the individual can
bring suit in these jurisdictions which retain governmental immunity, some
courts have indicated the possibility of recognizing constructive or im-
plied consent. The primary area in which such constructive or implied con-
sent has been discussed is the situation in which a governmental entity
performs part of its function through agencies organized in corporate
form which are protected by liability insurance. Although no court has
decided a case on this basis, the legislatures of several states have acted by
consenting to liability to the extent of insurance coverage."' It should be
noted, however, that consent to sue is not necessarily a waiver of govern-
mental immunity, nor does it always insure the party bringing suit that a
.. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
s' In twenty-five of these states, municipalities are liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of employees engaged in a proprietary function. The attempted distinction between governmental
and proprietary functions has resulted in a hopeless morass of court decisions from which no useful
standard can be derived. For example, in Alabama, county and city school boards are not strictly
governmental agencies so they have no immunity. Ex parle Bd. of School Comm'rs, 230 Ala. 304,
161 So. 108 (1935). However, the cutting of weeds along a public highway is a governmental
function protected by governmental immunity. Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151
So. 2d 240 (1963).
.
5 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-3505 (1961); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (1964); MONT.
REv. CODEs ANN. § 83-701 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:3 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
5§ 5-6-18 to 5-6-22 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-08 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 47, §§ 157.1-158.2 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 634 (1962).
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judgment will be satisfied. It necessarily follows that if the citizen is to be
compensated for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the state or
one of its political subdivisions there must be consent to bring suit and
consent to pay the claim if the injured party is to be successful.
Exceptions Providing for Liability. In the states which have retained the
common law doctrine of governmental immunity, there are four signifi-
cant areas indicating the development of a trend for the state to give con-
sent to suit and to provide for payment of successful claims. These areas
include the acceptance of liability for (1) defective highways, roads, and
bridges, (2) defective public buildings, (3) negligent operation of a gov-
ernment vehicle by an employee while in the scope of his employment, and
(4) damages, to the extent of liability insurance coverage, caused by the
tortious conduct of a governmental entity.
Acceptance of Liability for Defective Highways, Roads, and Bridges.
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Tennessee acknowledge liability for defective highways, roads, and bridges
if the state had adequate notice of the defect."5 ' In these six states there is
generally an explicit waiver by the state of governmental immunity for
injuries caused by such defects, and the injured party is given permission
to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the plaintiff must
first file a claim with the official agency which has responsibility for the
highway, road, or bridge and only when compensation is denied by that
agency can an action be brought. In contrast to these six states which
have accepted liability for defective highways, roads, and bridges, nine
states have made counties liable by statute" and fourteen have imposed
liability on municipalities by statute or court decision in this same area. "
In the jurisdictions in which the county or municipality is made liable for
defective highways, roads, and bridges, a claim must first be filed with the
responsible governing unit, and if the claim is denied, suit can be brought
against the county or municipality. With regard to the liability of the
state, county, or municipality for defective roadways, a common prerequi-
site exists that the governing body must have actual or constructive no-
tice of the defect before it can be charged with liability.
Acceptance of Liability for Defective Public Buildings. Michigan and
'
54 KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 68-419 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 18 (1964); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. 55 691.1402, 691.1403 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 247:17 (1964); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-229 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-812 (Supp. 1968); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-801 to -814 (1956).
5 5 GA. CODE ANN. § 95-1001 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-301 (1964); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 84, § 15 (1967); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1402 (1968); NEB. REV.
STAT. 55 14-801, 39-809 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 247:17 (1964); OHiso REV. CODE
ANN. 5 305.12 (Page 1953); S.D. CODE § 28.0913 (Supp. 1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. 5
17-10-17 (1966).
"' Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 114 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1959); Weisner v. Mayor
& Council of Rockville, 225 A.2d 648 (Md. Ct. App. 1967); ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 502 (1958);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-301 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3655 (1965); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 84, S 15 (1967); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. 55 691.1402, 691.1403 (1968);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-801, 39-809 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 247:17 (1964); N.D.
CENT. CODE 55 40-42-01 to 40-42-05 (1968); OHiio REV. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 723.01 (Page
1954); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-70 (1962); S.D. CODE § 28.0913 (Supp. 1960); W. VA. CODE
ANN. 5 17-10-17 (1966).
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Tennessee have accepted liability for injuries caused by defects in state
buildings and have imposed similar liability on the counties of the state." '
Michigan also extends this liability to the municipality for such defects.
On the other hand, Alabama imposes liability on the municipality with-
out making the state or county branches of government liable for in-
juries caused by similar defects.'' In these jurisdictions, the liability of the
respective governmental body depends upon its having notice of the
defect. There is no liability for latent defects; liability arises only when
the governmental unit had actual or constructive notice of the defect.
Acceptance of Liability for the Negligent Operation of a Government
Vehicle. The third area in which there appears to be a trend toward the
acceptance of tort liability in spite of the general rule of governmental
immunity involves the negligent operation of a government vehicle by an
employee while acting in the scope of his employment. The legislatures of
Colorado, Michigan, and South Carolina have enacted legislation which
extends liability to the state and all of its political subdivisions for in-
juries and damages caused by the negligent operation of government ve-
hicles by government employees."1 9 Tennessee has a similar statute rele-
gating liability to the state level only; its county and municipal branches
of government remain free from liability."' Conversely, Pennsylvania has
imposed liability on counties and municipalities for negligent operation of
motor vehicles by government employees while the state remains free from
similar liability.'"' Ohio also has become part of this trend, but liability in
that state is limited to the municipality.' The most recent development
in this area came in 1968 when the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that
in spite of the general rule of governmental immunity, all cities and other
governmental subdivisions and local public bodies of the state would no
longer be immune from tort liability arising from the ownership, use, and
operation of motor vehicles." 3
Acceptance of Liability to the Extent of Insurance Coverage. In the
states which retain the common law rule of governmental immunity, the
most significant exception which has developed is the acceptance by the
governmental unit of liability, to the extent of insurance coverage, for
damages and injuries caused by the tortious conduct of its employees. Of
the thirty jurisdictions which remain generally immune from tort liability,
the legislatures of nine states have authorized state agencies to purchase li-
ability insurance."4 In eleven states, counties have similar authorization. 65
'" MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1406 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-812 (Supp. 1968).
"' ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 502 (1959).
'59COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-10-1 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1405 (1968); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-229 (1962).
"'TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-812 (Supp. 1968).
' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 623 (1960).
"'.OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 701.02 (Page 1954).
'"Brown v. City of Omaha, 160 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Neb. 1968).
'" IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-3505 (1961); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 12-2602 (1964); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. S 83-701 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:3 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
5-6-18 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-08 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, 5
157.1-158.1 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 634 (1962).
i'Brown v. City of Omaha, 160 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2437
(1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 41-3505 (1961); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2601 (1964); N.H.
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An additional eleven states authorize the purchase of liability insurance by
municipalities.'" Even though the purchase of liability insurance generally
is not mandatory, the purchase of such insurance, where authorized, is ap-
parently the practice rather than the exception. Typically, the purchase of
liability insurance constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity to the
extent of insurance coverage; thus judgments in excess of policy limits
are generally of no force and effect."'
Presentation of Claims. In the states which retain common law immun-
ity and which have statutorily or judicially accepted liability in one or
more of the areas discussed above, a pattern for processing claims against
the state and its political subdivisions has developed. Generally, the states
have established an administrative procedure in which a court of claims or
a board of adjustment is set up for the express purpose of hearing claims
against the state.' The statutes which create these courts and boards
generally authorize the court or board to hear claims which the state in
good faith and conscience should pay. Often the claim must first be de-
nied by the responsible state agency before an action can be commenced.
The weight accorded this administrative hearing varies. In a few states
the court or board can directly authorize payment; however, in most jur-
isdictions, the findings of the court or board are only recommendatory in
nature. Thus, upon receiving these recommendations, the state legislature
must pass a special bill to authorize payment of the claim.
B. States Which Have Altered Substantially the Common Law Rule
of Governmental Immunity
General Rule of Liability. In the remaining twenty states, the doctrine of
governmental immunity has been altered substantially; however, the de-
gree of alteration varies from state to state. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa,
Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Washington have abrogated the im-
munity with respect to both the state and its political subdivisions."
REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:3 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-18 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE
39-01-08 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 307.44 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11,
5 16.1 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 65713 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 804-10(f) (1966).
5 66
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2437 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-3505 (1961); KAN. STAT.
ANN. S 12-2601 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 412:3 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-18
(Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-08 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 16.1 (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2303 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-4-10(f) (1966); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 15.1-4 (1965).
167 See statutes cited note 164 supra.
'
68 ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 333, 334 (1960); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 130-10-4 (Supp.
1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 4-141 to -165 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. 5 47-504 (1965);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 3A-D (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6401-.6475 (1962);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 127.11 (Page Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 22-7.1-1 to
22-7.1-7 (1968); S.D. CODE §§ 33.4301-.4308 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-801 to
-815 (1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-12 (Supp. 1968).
169Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 09.50.250, 09.65.70 (1962); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965) (Carter v. County
of Hawaii, 47 Hawaii 68, 384 P.2d 308 (1963), extended liability to the political subdivisions of
the state); IOWA CODE § 25A.4 (1967) (Lindstrom v. Mason City, 256 Iowa 83, 126 N.W.2d
292 (1964), extended liability to the local branches of government); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41-031
(1967); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963) (Spiegler v. School Dist. of City of New
Rochelle, 39 Misc. 2d 720, 241 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 623, 243
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1963), waived immunity of all political subdivisions); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (1)
(1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (Supp. 1968).
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Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, and Minnesota have abrogated the
doctrine at the municipal level, but the immunity of the state has been
preserved to a great extent. 7 ' Vermont has abrogated the immunity at
the state level without making significant changes in the rule as applied
to its political subdivisions. "' California, Illinois, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Utah, and Wisconsin have made substantial changes in the immun-
ity doctrine without abrogating the rule with regard to any political en-
tity of the state.'
Abrogation of the Immunity at the State and Municipal Levels. In the
jurisdictions where governmental immunity has been abrogated, the courts
have been almost as active as the legislatures in accomplishing this abro-
gation. Of the eight states which have abrogated the immunity of the
state and its political subdivisions, only Alaska, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington have done so solely through legislative enactment.' Typical-
ly, the statutes of these four states waive the immunity of the state and
its political subdivisions and provide that the state consents to have its
liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied in
civil actions against individuals and corporations.
Similar statutes are in effect in Hawaii, Iowa, and New York, but the
statutes of these three states do not expressly extend liability to the polit-
ical subdivisions of the state." However, in these three jurisdictions, the
courts have extended tort liability to the political subdivisions of the state
on the ground that the immunity of a political subdivision exists only be-
cause of its status as a branch of the sovereign or state. "' Thus, when the
state waives its immunity, the immunity of the political subdivision is
waved to the same extent.
In 1963, Arizona by court decision abrogated the immunity of the state
and its political subdivisions."' The state supreme court thoroughly ex-
amined the rule of governmental immunity and concluded that it should
be discarded. In this regard, the court stated:
It requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that if the indi-
vidual citizen is left to bear almost all the risk of a defective, negligent,
perverse or erroneous administration of the state's functions, an unjust
' 'Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1968); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5
466.01-17 (1963).
'i'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 5 5601 (Supp. 1968).
12Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966); CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 810-006.6 (West
1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.1 (Smith-Hurd 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§
1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160-191.1, 160-191.4 (Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §5 63-30-3, 63-30-34 (1968);
WIS. STAT. ANN § 895.43 (1966).
"'aALASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.250, 09.65.070 (1962); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1967); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (1963); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.96-019 (1968).
174 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE § 25A.4 (1967); N.Y. CT. CL.
ACT 5 8 (McKinney 1963).
"'Carter v. County of Hawaii, 47 Hawaii 68, 384 P.2d 308 (1963); Lindstrom v. Mason
City, 256 Iowa 83, 126 N.W.2d 292 (1964); Spiegler v. School Dist. of City of New Rochelle,
39 Misc. 2d 720, 241 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 751, 243 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1963).
'"'Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
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burden will become graver and more frequent as the government's activities
are expanded and become more diversified.177
Thus, in Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New York, Oregon,
and Washington, as the activities of the state have expanded, giving rise
to the inevitable increase in injuries caused by the tortious conduct of
governmental employees, liability has been accepted by the state and its
political subdivisions.
Abrogation of Immunity at the Municipal Level Only. Arkansas, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Kentucky, and Minnesota also have been a part of the trend
toward placing greater risk and burden on the political entity for its tor-
tious conduct. However, in these five states governmental immunity has
been abrogated only with regard to municipalities; the state itself remains
generally immune from tort liability. In Minnesota, liability has been
imposed on municipalities by statute." ' However, in Arkansas, Florida, In-
diana, and Kentucky, such liability has been imposed upon the municipal
branches of government by the courts. "
Florida became the first of these states to abolish municipal immunity
through court decision when in 1957 its supreme court held that an
action could be maintained by a widow against a city for the wrongful
death of her husband who died of smoke suffocation after being locked in
a jail which was left unattended. The court rejected the idea that it is
better for an individual to suffer grievous wrong than to impose liability
on the people vicariously through their government. In abandoning im-
munity as applied to the municipality, the court stated that "when an
individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the
negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his
employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong
done."' 8 In 1967 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an explanation of its
1957 decision, equated the liability of a municipal corporation to that of
181
a private corporation.
The highest court of Kentucky abolished the immunity of the muni-
cipality in a case involving the death of a child in a swimming pool op-
erated by the city."' In 1968 the courts of Indiana'83 and Arkansas'84 also
abolished the tort immunity of the municipality. The courts of these three
states reasoned that the doctrine can no longer be justified as a rule of law
because it unjustly places the burden for torts committed by political en-
tities on the individual citizens who suffer the injuries.
Abrogation of Immunity at the State Level Only. Although the general
trend appears to be to impose greater liability on the municipality than
117381 P.2d at 109.
"..MIINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01-17 (1967).
'""Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Klepinger v. Board of
Comm'rs, 239 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. 1964).
... Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133-34 (Fla. 1957).
"' Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70, 73 (Fla. 1967).
"'sHaney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
"'Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968).
'
84 Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
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on the state, Vermont is the exception, having a statute which provides
that the state shall be liable for its torts to the same extent as a private
person. "5 However, liability is not placed upon municipalities by this
statute, and the courts of that state have not yet acted to extend the
liability.
Substantial Change in the Doctrine of Governimental Immunity With-
out Abrogating the Doctrine at Any Level of Government. In contrast
to the fourteen states which have abrogated the immunity at either or both
the state and municipal levels, California, Illinois, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Utah, and Wisconsin have brought about substantial change in the
immunity without abrogating it as applied to any governmental entity.
New Jersey and Wisconsin have experienced significant change in the im-
munity as a result of court decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
has held that municipalities are liable for active wrongdoing or damages
and injuries caused by negligent acts of commission as distinguished from
negligent failure to act."H Although this decision falls short of abrogating
the immunity doctrine, it creates a substantial exception to the immunity
by imposing liability in cases of active negligence. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin also has made a substantial change in the doctrine by hold-
ing that state immunity from tort liability is abolished subject to the
requirement of the Wisconsin Constitution that the legislature shall direct
the manner in which the state shall be sued."' This limitation is not a sig-
nificant handicap because the legislature has given substantial consent
to be sued. '
Without abrogating the immunity of any political entity, the legisla-
tures of California, Illinois, North Carolina, and Utah have brought about
substantial change in the immunity doctrine through statutory schemes
typically providing that the state is immune from suit unless otherwise
provided by legislative act.' 8 Since these states have enacted a significant
number of legislative exceptions to the immunity doctrine, the result is
governmental acceptance of liability in the areas in which most injuries
occur and in which the public has the greatest need for protection. Even
though these states by legislation have waived tort immunity in many
areas, the most significant is the waiver of immunity and acceptance of
liability for injury proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of
a government employee committed within the scope of his employment.
Exceptions Providing for Immunity. Even within those states which
have taken substantial action toward providing a means of redress for
torts inflicted by the agents of the state and its political subdivisions, a
considerable number of exceptions have developed as a result of legislative
"S VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 5 5601 (Supp. 1968).
1""Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966).
18 THolytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
1
88 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.43 (1966).
"'9CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 5§ 439.1-.24
(Smith-Hurd 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-191.1, 160-191.4 (Supp. 1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. §5 63-30-3, 63-30-34 (1968).
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and judicial action. A general statutory waiver of governmental immun-
ity does not prevent the creation of exceptions to the general rule of liabil-
ity because the statutory waivers generally provide that the immunity of
the state from suit is waived, except as otherwise provided by statute. In
this manner legislatures which have waived immunity have retained an
effective means of creating exceptions to the general rule of liability. In
jurisdictions in which the courts have acted to abrogate the doctrine of im-
munity, either the courts or the legislatures have found it necessary to
create exceptions which effectively preserve the immunity in certain
areas. The areas in which immunity has been preserved generally are rec-
ognized as problem areas, and a number of jurisdictions indicate that in
these specific areas, a political entity should not be required to accept li-
ability. Thus, it is apparent that no state has accepted complete liability
for its tortious conduct.
Legislative action has resulted in the development of six widely adopted
exceptions to the general rule of liability in the twenty jurisdictions which
have accepted substantial tort liability. The six exceptions may be classi-
fied as (1) intentional torts, (2) discretionary functions, (3) execution
of a statute, (4) quarantine, (5) punitive damages, and (6) inspections.
Intentional Tort Exception. Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, California, Iowa,
Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin have adopted the intentional tort exception
to liability."' The statutes of these states vary, and while the major empha-
sis appears to be a denial of liability for damages caused by misrepresenta-
tion of a governmental employee, most of the statutes are of a more gen-
eral nature. Typically, these statutes provide that there is no liability on
the state or its political subdivisions for claims arising out of assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with con-
tract rights. Thus these statutes apparently are designed not only to pre-
vent recovery when the claim arises from an intentional tort committed
by a government employee, but also to prevent recovery when specific
governmental functions (e.g., prosecution, service of process) are inten-
tionally or negligently misused.
Discretionary Function Exception. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and
Washington have preserved an exception in the area of discretionary func-
tions."1 The major purpose of this exception is to protect political entities
"'ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(3) (1966); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.8 (West 1966) (misrepre-
sentations of employee); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 822.2 (West 1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS §
245A-1 (d) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-107 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (libel and
slander of employee of local public entity); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-106 (Smith-Hurd
1966) (misrepresentation of employee of local public entity); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 85, § 2-210
(Smith-Hurd 1966) (negligent misrepresentation of public employees); IOWA CODE ANN. §
25A.14 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(2) (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30-10(6)
(1968) (misrepresentation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(6) (Supp. 1968); WIs. STAT. ANN.
5 895.43(3) (1966).
" Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (1968) (although this case abrogated
governmental immunity for' the municipality the decision preserved this exception); Barnum v.
State, 435 P.2d 678 (Wash. 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1962); CAL. Gov'T CODE
820.2 (West 1966); HAWAII REv. LAWS S 245A-15(a) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 85,
2-201 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IoWA CoDrE ANN. § 25A.14(l) (1967); MTNN. STAT. ANN.
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from liability while acting or failing to act in a discretionary matter. For
instance, there would be no liability for locating or failing to locate a
particular facility at a particular location, for building or failing to build
a highway on a particular route, or for prosecuting or failing to prosecute
an individual charged with a crime. In the jurisdictions which have adopt-
ed this exception, the statutes and the courts have stated that there shall
be no liability for a claim based upon the exercise of, or the failure to ex-
ercise, a discretionary function on the part of a state agency, employee, or
political subdivision, whether or not the discretion is abused.
Execution of Statute Exception. Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, California,
Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, and Vermont have enacted an excep-
tion denying liability when the injury or damage which is the basis of the
claim occurs during the execution of a statute or regulation by a govern-
ment employee.'92 The wordings of the statutes creating this exception
are such that the exception has little significance because these statutes
usually provide that there shall be no liability for an act or omission of a
government employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute or
regulation, regardless of whether such statute or regulation is valid. Thus
limiting this exception to a denial of liability only when the employee
exercises due care in the execution of the statute or regulation makes re-
covery possible when the employee acts negligently in such execution.
Quarantine Exception. A fourth exception which appears to be gaining
acceptance involves quarantines imposed by the state. Alaska, California,
Illinois, Iowa, and Vermont have enacted statutes providing that there
shall be no liability for any claim based on damages caused by the imposi-
tion or establishment of a quarantine by the state for the prevention or
control of communicable disease.'
Punitive Damage Exception. Although the punitive damage exception
is a limitation on the amount of damages rather than a refusal to accept
liability, it has gained wide acceptance in recent years. California, Hawaii,
Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, and Wisconsin have enacted legislation
which prevents the recovery of punitive damages in any action against
the state or any local unit of government.'
Inspection Exception. Another exception which has gained some accep-
tance involves inspections. California, Illinois, Nevada, and Utah have
enacted legislation which generally provides that there shall be no liability
§ 466.03(6) (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032(2) (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. S 30.265 (2) (e)
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-10(1) (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(1) (Supp.
1968).
1.2 ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1962); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4, 820.6 (West 1966);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 245A-15(a) (Supp., 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-202, 2-203
(Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 25A.14(1) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(5)
(1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032(1) (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265(2)(d) (1967);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(1) (Supp. 1968).
19 3ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(2) (1962); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 855.4 (West 1966); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 6-104 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IoWA CODE ANN. S 25A.14(3) (1967);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(3) (Supp. 1968).
"94CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, S 2-102 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04(1) (1967); NEV.




for injuries caused by failure to make an inspection or by reason of mak-
ing an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than its
own, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any
enactment or contains or constitutes a hazard to health or safety."'
Governmental Function Exception, Created by the Courts. The only
exception which has been created widely by the courts is the govern-
mental function exception granting immunity to the governmental en-
tity when acting strictly in a governmental capacity." Generally, this
exception preserves immunity for any act which is unique to governments
and which cannot be carried on by individuals or corporations. Legislative
or judicial actions are typical examples. However, this exception has been
extended by court decision to include anything which may be classified
as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.
Other Exceptions. Seventeen other exceptions are worthy of brief con-
sideration since they have been enacted into legislation in one or more
of the twenty jurisdictions which have accepted liability in a number of
areas. These exceptions include:
(1) Licenses-No liability for damages or injuries caused by the is-
suance, denial, suspension or revocation of, by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization where the entity or its employees are au-
thorized by legislative enactment to determine whether or not such au-
thorization should be issued, denied, suspended, or revoked.19'
(2) Legislation-No liability for an injury caused by adopting or fail-
ing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any existing legisla-
tion.
18
(3) Recreational Areas-No liability for injuries caused by the use of
public property as parks, playgrounds, or recreational areas in the ab-
sence of willful and wanton negligence on the part of the state or its
subdivisions."'
(4) Escaping Prisoner-No liability for injury or damage inflicted by
an escaping or escaped prisoner."°
(5) National Guard-No liability for claims arising out of combatant
activities of the national or state guard."'
.. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 818.6, 821.4 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, 55 2-105, 2-207
(Smith-Hurd 1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.033(1) (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30-10(4)
(1968).
198Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (1968); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957); Granger v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 742
(1961); Creelman v. Swennings, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966); Evangelical United
Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.6
(West 1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.43(3) (1966).
97 Granger v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1961); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
818.4 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-104, 2-206 (Smith-Hurd 1966); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 63-30-10(3) (1968).
"' CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 818.2, 821 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-103, 2-205
(Smith-Hurd 1966).1 5
'CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-106 (Smith-Hurd
1966); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30-10(11) (1968).
00 CAL. GOV'T CODE 55 844.6, 845.8 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 4-106(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(10) (1968).
101HAWAII REV. LAws § 245A-15(e) (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(9)
(1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(5) (1968).
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(6) Weather Conditions on Roadways-No liability for injuries caused
by the effects of weather conditions on streets, highways, alleys, side-
walks, or other public places." '
(7) Entry Upon Property-No liability for damages or injury caused
by entry upon property by a government employee when such entry is
expressly or impliedly authorized by law."'
(8) Maintenance of Public Property-No liability for the care, main-
tenance, or design of public property."
(9) Tragic Signals-No liability for initially failing to provide traffic
warning signals and signs.'
(10) Fire Department-No liability for failing to provide a fire de-
partment or for otherwise failing to provide fire protection or to suppress
or contain fires."
(11) School Safety Patrol-No liability for claims arising from the
organization, operation, or maintenance of a school safety patrol.20 '
(12) Civil Defense-No liability for personal injury or property dam-
age sustained by any person acting as a volunteer civilian defense worker.
No liability for damages and injuries caused by civil defense workers in
the absence of willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith.' s
(13) Police Service-No liability for failing to establish a police de-
partment or otherwise failing to provide police protection service, or, if
police protection service is provided, no liability for failing to provide
adequate police protection service.""
(14) Death Actions-In the case of death caused by the tortious con-
duct of the state, liability shall be limited to actual or compensatory dam-
ages."'
(15) Riots-No liability for injury or claims arising out of or result-
ing from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence,
or civil disturbance. " '
(16) Emergency Vehicles-No liability for injuries arising out of a col-
lision or accident involving emergency vehicles of the state. '
(17) Latent Defects-No liability for injuries caused by latent defects
in public buildings."'
Although all of the exceptions listed and discussed are not extremely
202 CAL. GoV'T CODE 5 831 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, 5 3-105 (Smith-Hurd
1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(4) (1967).




'CAL. Gov'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-102 (Smith-Hurd
1966).
202 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.4, 830.8 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, S 3-104 (Smith-
Hurd 1966).
206 King v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 241, 152 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1956); CAL.




ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-211 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
20 ALASKA STAT. 5 26.20.140 (1962).
209King v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 241, 152 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1956); CAL.
GoV'T CODE § 845 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 4-102 (Smith-Hurd 1966).0 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965).
211 UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-10(7) (1968).
221d. § 63-30-7.
" Id. § 63-30-9.
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significant, they at least form a reference point and indicate areas that
should be considered in any legislative plan containing a waiver of state
immunity.
Summary. While governmental immunity remains solidly entrenched in
some thirty jurisdictions, the development of exceptions in these states
reveals the general trend away from the strict concept of governmental
immunity. The areas in which liability has been accepted within these
states, however, are not as significant as might appear. More of these
jurisdictions have accepted liability for injuries caused by defects in high-
ways, roads, and bridges than in any other area. However, one might well
question the percentage of total injuries caused by such defects. The neg-
ligent operation of government vehicles and defects in public buildings
appear to constitute a greater threat to public safety; yet fewer states have
accepted liability in these two areas than have accepted liability for de-
fective roadways.
It should also be noted that none of the thirty states which retain the
common law rule of governmental immunity has accepted liabiliy in the
area which gives rise to the greatest number of injuries-the negligent
acts of governmental employees. However, among the exceptions which
have developed, the most significant and widely adopted is the acceptance
by the governmental body of liability to the extent of insurance coverage
for the negligence of its employees. Since liability is limited to the extent
of insurance coverage, it appears that the states adopting this exception
are attempting to balance the need of the public for protection from
bearing the expense of tortious injuries inflicted by governmental em-
ployees with the interest of the state in avoiding suits that might prove
costly.
In balancing the interest of the state in remaining free from suit with
the need to protect the public from bearing the burden of injuries in-
flicted by the negligence of governmental employees, twenty states have
reacted affirmatively by either abrogating or substantially altering the
rule of governmental immunity. It should be noted, however, that no
jurisdiction accepts complete liability for the tortious conduct of its em-
ployees. Even in jurisdictions which have abrogated the immunity, it has
been necessary to create exceptions which effectively preserve to the po-
litical entities immunity from suit. It would appear that in certain areas
the consensus is that the state must retain its immunity in order to func-
tion effectively without fear of liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since it is apparent that the present status of governmental immunity
in Texas is inadequate and since the Texas Legislature has the power to
correct this inadequacy, 14 the question becomes one of finding the ap-
propriate statutory scheme to achieve this purpose. For example, judicial
214See text accompanying notes 63-150 supra.
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abrogation of governmental immunity in 1961 by the Supreme Court
of California"'5 forced the legislature of that state to fashion a compre-
hensive legislative solution. Immediate response to the court's action by
the California Assembly was a two-year moratorium during which a
careful legislative study of the problem was undertaken. As a result of
that study, the California Assembly enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme in 1963 which reflects sound principles that should be considered
in any legislative plan which alters the tort immunity of the state and
its political subdivisons.
The basic principle underlying the California solution is the need to
balance the legitimate interest of the public with that of the state. The
private individual should not be required to bear the burden for injuries
sustained as a result of the tortious conduct of public employees. At the
same time, the state has an interest in not being subjected to the over-
whelming burden of suits and payment of resulting claims which might
follow total abrogation of immunity. The interest of the state was served
in California by legislation which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by statute a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee . . . .""' Thus, the state is protected since the common law of
immunity is statutorily preserved, and suits cannot be brought unless con-
sent is given by the General Assembly in the form of exceptions created
by legislative act. On the other hand, the legitimate needs of the public
are met in this statutory scheme by a broad legislative exception to such
immunity, which provides for liability for injuries proximately caused
by an act or omission of an employee of a public entity within the scope
of his employment.21 Since this exception is broad enough to cover the
area in which most injuries occur, the public no longer bears the major
burden for the torts of public employees.
Although this discussion is an over-simplification of the solution
adopted in California, 18 it reveals a practical option to total abrogation of
the immunity. The courts of Texas should be opened to those who are
injured through the tortious conduct of the employees of political enti-
ties; however, total abrogation of the doctrine, without exception thereto,
appears to be an improper approach to the problem. In every jurisdiction
in which the doctrine of immunity has been abrogated, it has been neces-
sary for the courts or the legislature to create exceptions and to preserve
state immunity in specific areas. Thus, it appears that statutory enactment
of governmental immunity accompanied by an exception providing for
liability for negligent acts or omissions of public employees within the
scope of their employment constitutes the first major portion of a prac-
tical legislative plan altering governmental immunity.
Accompanying this exception, which provides that political entities
21s Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
.. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1966).
217 Id. § 815.2.




are liable for the negligent acts or omissions of government employees, a
provision for the acceptance of liability for the negligent operation of
motor vehicles by government employees is appropriate. While the ac-
ceptance of liability for negligent acts may be construed to cover negli-
gent operation of a motor vehicle, its specific inclusion provides unques-
tionable legislative intent in an area where the potentiality for injury to
private individuals is greatest.
The acceptance of liability for injuries caused by the defective condi-
tion of highways, roads, bridges, and public buildings is also appropriate.
Not only should the public be protected from bearing the burden for
injuries caused by the negligence of public employees, but the private
individual should be able to make use of public facilities (roadways
and buildings) without bearing the expense for injuries caused by their
defective condition.
It should be noted that the acceptance of liability in the areas sug-
gested- (1) negligent act or omission of government employees, (2) neg-
ligent operation of motor vehicles, (3) defective roadways, and (4)
defective public buildings--necessitates the further creation of excep-
tions to liability in these four areas. The experience of other jurisdictions
has shown that the acceptance of liability in these four areas in broad
terms places liability on the state in areas in which the state has a legiti-
mate need to retain its immunity. Thus the following exceptions appear
relevant: (1) no liability for intentional torts of public employees, (2)
no liability for damages caused by judicial or legislative acts, (3) no li-
ability for injuries caused by emergency vehicles unless gross negligence is
shown, and (4) no liability for defective roadways or buildings in the
absence of actual or constructive notice of the defect. With the availabil-
ity of this wide range of exceptions, the limitations which should be
imposed depend upon the extent to which the legislature desires to pro-
tect the private individual from the burden of the tortious conduct of
public employees.
Legislative enactment of the common law doctrine of governmental
immunity accompanied by specifically tailored exceptions thereto grants
substantial protection to the public without subjecting the political en-
tities of the state to unreasonable litigation and claims. Since this should
be the appropriate goal of any future legislation which alters the doctrine
of governmental immunity, a legislative plan based on the considerations
discussed above should reap the benefit of the experiences of a number of
jurisdictions which have also attempted to solve the problem.
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